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Abstract
We discuss the effects of AD–protection in a standard Dixit model of entry deterrence.
In an AD–regime, the newcomer is constrained by a minimum–price rule in addition to
existing irreversible entrance costs. For minimum prices which lie below the Stackelberg
one, we ﬁnd that AD–rules distort competition. We show that AD–protection increases
the advantages of entry deterrence for a wide range of combinations of sunk costs and
minimum prices. When entrance costs are high, consumer welfare is lower in an AD–
regime than under free trade. Consequently, AD–protection facilitates the abuse of market
dominance.
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1 Introduction
Anti–dumping (AD-) actions are legitimate measures permitted under Article VI
GATT/WTO rules, and are by now the most frequently employed instrument of
’contingent protection’ 1 . Over the past decade, almost 2,500 AD cases were in-
vestigated and notiﬁed to the GATT. Of these, almost 50 per cent were initiated by
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1 Contingent protection refers to anti–dumping and countervailing duties (Article VI) and
emergency protection under the GATT–WTO’s principal safeguards clause (Article XIX).the four ’traditional’ user countries 2 and approximately 40 per cent by developing
countries as Mexico, South Africa or India. 3 Hence, AD–protection is a global
phenomenon. The effects of AD–measures therefore deserve scrutiny.
The rational of AD–laws is to protect domestic competition from ’unfairly’ low
priced imports. However, a large and still growing body of literature has argued
that it is not dumping but AD–policy, which undermines competition as AD–rules
have unintended, anti–competitive side–effects. Here, the bulk of the literature has
concentrated on the ’collusive impact’ of anti–dumping, i.e. on only one particular
type of competition restricting behaviour.4
The objective of this paper is to analyse whether AD-policy facilitates the ’abuse
of a dominant market position’, which is another form of anti–competitive busi-
ness conduct. According to an OECD-deﬁnition, a ﬁrm abuses its dominance, if ”it
is systematically restricting the ability of actual or potential competitors to serve
consumers, and is doing this without at the same time achieving efﬁciencies bene-
ﬁting consumers.” (OECD, 2000, p. 2) The main question we pose in this paper is
how AD–rules alter the capability of incumbent ﬁrms to defend their monopoly po-
sition vis–a–vis potential competition, in other words how AD–legislation affects
the contestability of a market.
To analyse this question, we employ a variant of the well–known Dixit model of
entry deterrence where an incumbent ﬁrm and a potential foreign rival interact. 5
We compare two different regimes: a free trade regime as well as an AD–regime.
Under free trade, market access of the potential foreign entrant is restricted only
due to the existence of sunk costs. Under AD–rules, the newcomer additionally
faces a price restriction, which forbids him to undercut an exogenously speciﬁed
minimum price.
2 They are the European Union (EU), Australia, the United States (US) and Canada.
3 These numbers are taken from UNCTAD (2000). A number of recent studies have also
documented the recent increase in the global importance of anti–dumping. See e.g. Miranda
et al. (1998), Kempton et al. (1999) as well as Finger and Schuknecht (1999).
4 For example, Prusa (1992) and Panagariya and Gupta (1998) demonstrate how AD leg-
islation can be used to reach collusive agreements, Fischer (1992), Reitzes (1993), Prusa
(1994), Steagall (1995) and Pauwels et al. (1997) show how contingent protection may fa-
cilitate tacit collusion , while Staiger and Wolak (1989) as well as Hartigan (2000) discuss
how AD-rules affect the ability to sustain collusion among domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
5 See Dixit (1980). There is a considerable amount of trade policy literature which applies
the capacity commitment approach, orvariations on it, toanalyse entry-deterring behaviour.
See the papers by Brander and Spencer (1987), Dixit and Kyle (1985), Ishibashi (1991) and
Campbell (2000). Neither one of this paper has applied the framework of Dixit. Moreover,
most of the papers assume that the foreign ﬁrm is the incumbent and hence discuss the role
of trade policy to ’promote’, instead of deter entry. The exemption is Campbell (2000) who
discusses the effects of an import quota on entry–deterring behaviour in a Milgrom and
Roberts type model.
2The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we describe the indispensable institu-
tional and legal framework of AD–legislation and explain why AD–rules serve to
establishminimumprices. In section 3 we brieﬂy present Dixit’smodel.The effects
of the minimum price rule are analysed in section 4. We discuss our main results in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional and legal background
Article VI of the GATT–1994 and the WTO–AD–Agreement (ADA) allow its sig-
natories to impose duties on imports if two conditions are met: ﬁrst, products are
dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of the importing country at less than
their ’normal’ or ’fair’ value. Second, dumping causes ’material’ injury to the do-
mestic ﬁrm. The ADA requires that AD–duties must be higher than the dumping
margin (i.e. the difference between the normal value and the import price). More-
over, their imposition is only allowed after dumping and injury have been proven
in a formal investigation,initiated by an application by or on behalf of the domestic
industry. 6
In section 4, we model AD–legislation as a minimum price rule which forbids the
foreign ﬁrm to undercut the ’normal value’ or the ’fair price’ of the product. More-
over, we assume that the normal value is exogenous to domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
In the following, we brieﬂy explain the reasons for these two assumptions.
The assumption that AD–legislation de facto establishes a minimum price, has two
reasons: ﬁrst, WTO rules explicitly envisage the direct introduction of import mini-
mum prices through the negotiations of so–called price undertakings. According to
Article 8.1 ADA, authorities have the discretion to terminate or suspend proceed-
ings without imposing duties if an exporter commits to ”revise its prices [...] so that
the authorities are satisﬁed that the injuriouseffect of the dumpingis eliminated”. 7
Moreoverandsecondly,minimumprices may alsobeestablishedindirectly:F ore x-
ample, in the US, no duties as such are levied, but exporters are required to make
cash deposits: if no dumping is found in a review investigation one year later, the
exporter receives a full refund of the cash deposit, including interest. Hence, ex-
porters have strong incentives to adjust their prices to the minimum price in order
to avoid the duty payment. 8
6 The term ’material injury’ is not precisely deﬁned in multilateral trade rules. In fact, the
ADA lists 15 injury indicators, whereas an afﬁrmative ﬁnding can be established even if
none of these indicators points towards the existence of material injury, as article 3.4 ADA
explicitly states that no factor can give decisive guidance.
7 See Moore (2000b) and Pauwels and Springael (2000) for a review of the practice of
undertaking-acceptance in the US and the EU respectively.
8 The situation is different in the EU, where a prospective duty system is employed: the
3The assumption that the minimum price, i.e. the normal value of the product in
question, is exogenous to the foreign ﬁrm, at ﬁrst glance, seems to contradict the
usual deﬁnition of price–dumping. In fact, article 2.1 ADA indicates that national
authorities should preferably establish the normal value of the similar product on
the basis of the exporter’s home market price. This seems to imply that the for-
eign ﬁrm always has the option to avoid dumping by sufﬁciently raising the price
he charges on his domestic market. However, if there are ”not enough sales in the
’ordinary’ course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country” (ADA,
Article 2.2), authorities may choose between two alternative methods of normal
value calculation. The ﬁrst alternative is to ’construct’ the normal value, which in-
volves adding a ’reasonable’ proﬁt margin to the production costs in the foreign
local market. The second alternative is to establish the fair value on the basis of the
foreign producer’s export price to a third country. Obviously, national authorities
have considerable discretion (and ﬁrms little direct inﬂuence besides lobbying) in
determining the reasonableness of a certain proﬁt margin, or the choice of an ad-
equate third country. It follows that — at least in all cases where dumping is not
deﬁned as price dumping9 —, it is sensible to assume that the normal value is a
politicallyspeciﬁed minimumprice, which is exogenouslyimposed on theﬁrms.10
3 The Basic Model
A variant of the Dixit (1980) model is applied to analyse the effects of AD–reg-
ulations in the form of a minimum–price rule. Although it is well understood, we
present it elaborately as the analysis of the model below closely follows the Dixit
one.
level of the duties is set on the basis of past performance and applies to all future ex-
ports until the AD order expires. However, exporters can apply for a review and claim
refunds if they can show they are dumping no longer. Moreover, the Commission can im-
pose additionally (retroactive) tariffs if the foreign ﬁrm continues to dump. Again, there are
considerable incentives for foreign ﬁrms to refrain from undercutting the minimum price.
9 Even in this case, the normal value is frequently established on the basis of the ’facts
available’, if foreign ﬁrms are found to only partially co–operate in the investigation pro-
cess. In this case, home market prices are determined on the basis of rough allegations
of the complaining domestic industry. See Palmeter (1991) and Moore (2000a) for more
details as well as for reasons why ﬁrms frequently fail to co–operate with AD–authorities
during the investigation process.
10 Finger (1993, p. viii) also concludes that ”dumping is whatever you can get the govern-
ment to act against under the anti–dumping law”.
43.1 Demand, Cost and Proﬁt Functions
We consider a two–stage model of perfect information. In the ﬁrst period t1, a do-
mestic ﬁrm (H) operates on the market. It has the opportunity to extend its produc-
tion capacity kH. At the end ofthe ﬁrst period, a foreign ﬁrm (F) decides whether to
enter the market or not. In the second period t2, both ﬁrms simultaneously choose
the quantities. In deciding on the next period’s capacity level, the domestic ﬁrm an-
ticipates both the entry decision of the foreign ﬁrm and the outcome of the second–
stage quantity game. Similarly, when the foreign ﬁrm decides on entrance, it antic-
ipates the outcome of the second–stage game.
The ﬁrms face a time–invariant demand function. It is assumed to be linear, so that











where qH and qF denote the quantities supplied by the domestic and foreign ﬁrm
respectively. The parameter a is the reservation price.
In the ﬁrst period t1, the domestic ﬁrm can expand its capacity kH. One unit of ca-
pacity can be used to produce one unit of the consumption good. When the incum-
bent’s output in t2 is less than the previously installed capacity, it incurs a constant
unit cost c and ﬁxed costs of rkH to maintain the capacity.Given the domestic ﬁrm
maintains a capacity level kH at the beginning of t2 but wishes to produce more




) in addition to the production costs when qH
< kH. Therefore, the














When the previously installed capacity level is sufﬁcient for the desired output,
the marginal costs are c. In contrast, the latter equal c
+r when the ﬁrm chooses
to extend the capacity in the second period. Hence, the incumbent’s possibility to
install capacity in the pre–entry period t1 gives him a cost advantage.
Int1, theforeignﬁrm isnotpresent inthemarket, sothatithas toinstalltherequired
capacity when entering the market. For the foreign ﬁrm, the operating costs are
c
+r per unit of output. However, entering the domestic market is associated with
irreversible expenses z. As the domestic ﬁrm is already operating in the market, it









Both ﬁrms face a two–stage decision problem. In the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent
5chooses the next period’s capacity level and the foreign ﬁrm decides whether to
enter. Conditional on the strategies chosen in the ﬁrst period, the second stage is
formed by the simultaneous quantity choice of both ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm will take the










In selecting theown quantity,theforms regard theopponents quantityas given.The























The incumbent has two advantages over a potential entrant. By installing capacity
in the pre–entry period, he commits himself to a certain output. This gives him
a cost advantage as the next period’s marginal costs are lower. Yet, he has also a
strategic advantage as the ﬁrst move gives him the possibility to choose his most
desired outcome.
In deciding on the capacity level, the domestic ﬁrm has several options. Given the
threat of entry is credible, the incumbent may defend its market by installing a ca-
pacity level rendering a non–positive proﬁt for the potential entrant. Alternatively,
the domestic ﬁrm may allow entrance. In this situation he acts as the Stackelberg
leader.
Whenever the incumbent chooses the latter option, he picks a point on the foreign
ﬁrm’s reaction function, which maximises his own proﬁt. Inserting the entrant’s
reaction function into the incumbent’s proﬁt and maximising the latter with respect
to the quantity results in qS
H
= S















were the superscript F stands for free trade and indicates that no AD–regulation
exists. The superscript S marks variables speciﬁc for a Stackelberg outcome. Simi-






￿z. Clearly, the foreign ﬁrm only enters








6the exporting ﬁrms stays out of the market and entry is blocked. For those entry
barriers, the threat or entrance is not credible, so that the domestic ﬁrm behaves as
a monopoly.
If the domestic ﬁrm decides to defend its market, he chooses a capacity int1 and an
equivalent output in t2, so that entry becomes unproﬁtable for the potential export-
ing ﬁrm. The best response to every possible output level of the incumbent is given






￿z. It can be shown












trade situation. If the foreign ﬁrm observes an installed capacity level of kH
￿ kFD
H
and believes that the incumbent fully utilises this capacity level in case of an entry,
it will stay out of the market. Entry would result in non–positive proﬁts so that the
entry is deterred whenever kH
￿ kFD
H .
Whether the incumbent deters or allows entry depends on the proﬁt associated with
the appropriate alternative. Let pFD
H denote the proﬁt resulting from the deterrence
strategy. Then, the incumbent defends his market as long as pFD
H
> pFS
H , where pFS
H
is given in equation (6).
Using the equation (5) together with (2) in the proﬁt function and noting that qF















Comparing both proﬁts shows that pFD
H
>pFS















=32 (cf. appendix). As zDU
> zB,
z
￿ zDU are irrelevant.
Dependingontheleveloftheentrancecosts,theincumbentcanemploythreestrate-




), entry by an exporting ﬁrm









)2.I ft h ee n t r y




), the incumbent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deter entry.
He produces the quantity equivalent to the capacity speciﬁed in equation (7) and
balance a proﬁt of pFD




), the domestic ﬁrm
allows the foreign ﬁrm to enter the market. Then, he produces the quantity of the
Stackelberg leader S
=2 and receives pFS
H .
74 The Model with a Anti–Dumping Regulation
This section introduces an AD–regulation specifying a normal value into the above
described model. It is assumed that the AD–measures are enforced whenever the
market price is lower than an exogenously speciﬁed norm price pn.H o w e v e r ,i n
modelswith perfect information,theAD–measures need neverbeexecuted.Rather,
the normal value imposes an additional restriction to the ﬁrms. Apart from the
normal value, the model is identical to the one presented in the previous section.
It is reasonable to assume that the norm price is higher than the market price under
perfect competitionc






After the foreign ﬁrm has entered the market, AD–measures cannot be enforced as
long as the market price p exceeds the norm price, i.e. if p
￿ pn. This establishes a
price restriction inﬂuencing the foreign ﬁrm’s entry decision. As the ﬁrms set quan-
tities, it is convenient to transform the price restriction into an equivalent quantity
restriction. Employing the inverse demand curve (1), each norm price has a corre-





= b . It follows that the price restriction
p





It can also be assumed that the norm quantity will take a higher value than the
monopolyquantityQm and lowerthan thecompetitiveone S.Hence, thevalidrange






4.1 The Entrant’s Reaction Function
In the second stage of the game, the foreign ﬁrm chooses its quantity qF,s ot h a t
proﬁts are maximised. As opposed to the last section, two situations can be distin-
guished: when the price restriction or equivalentlythe quantityone are constraining
and when it has no effect. Maximising the proﬁt function subject to the quantity re-
















The upper line speciﬁes the behaviour of the entrant if the quantity restriction is
ineffective. It is identical to the one in equation (5). It shows that the entrant re-
sponds to an increase of the incumbent’s quantity by 2 units with a reduction of
one unit. When the quantity restriction is binding, the second line is relevant. Then,
the exporting ﬁrm’s reduction in production has to meet the incumbent’s increase
in output. Otherwise, the market price would fall below the normal value and the
AD–measures would be enforced.
84.2 The Incumbent’s Options
It is worth mentioning that the incumbent decides whether the price restriction is
binding or not, due to his ﬁrst–mover advantage. As a consequence, the domestic
ﬁrm can choose between two sets of strategies: the free–trade and the AD–strate-
gies. We refer to free–trade actions whenever the incumbent behaves as though no
AD–regulation exists, i.e. when the latter is ineffective. In contrast, AD–strategies
are those when the domestic ﬁrm chooses a capacity, so that the price restriction
becomes binding. As the free–trade strategies were presented in the last section, we
focus on the AD–ones here.
When the quantity restriction (9) is binding, the entrant’s reaction function is given





)qH and is valid when qH
￿ 2Qn
￿S. In addition, the quantity supplied by
the domestic ﬁrm will not exceed the norm quantity,so that qH
￿Qn. The appendix
shows that the incumbent’s optimal output is given by
qH







The equality between the incumbent’s output and the norm quantity results as the
proﬁt function fails to be strictly concave in the quantityqH when the restriction (9)
is binding. The intuition behind this result is simple. The incumbent knows exactly
that expanding the output by one unit will induce the exporting ﬁrm to reduce his
output by the same amount. When the entrant responds differently, AD–measures
are enforced. As a consequence, the price cannot drop below the normal value. In
addition, equation (11) shows that no entry occurs as long as the price restriction is








However, the domestic ﬁrm need not produce the norm quantity to prevent market
entry. The best response of the exporting ﬁrm to an arbitrary level of output qH is









￿z. Accordingly, the entrant would earn non–positive proﬁts when




















F is the foreign ﬁrm’s output which is determined by the intersection of the
reaction functions(10) for thecases when the restriction is bindingand not binding.
Here, kPD
H is the limit capacity under AD–rules. Therefore, entry is deterred for the
incumbent’s quantities speciﬁed in (13). When the incumbent chooses an output



























Giventhequantityrestrictionis binding,whethertheincumbentchooses to produce
a quantity equivalent to the norm quantity or to the entry deterring capacity in (13)
depends on which alternative promises the higher proﬁt. Therefore, the domestic
ﬁrm selects the entry deterring capacity, whenever pPD
H
> pPS
H . Comparing both
proﬁt functions shows that the incumbent produces the entry deterring quantity










incumbent’s output associated with the point at which the reaction function for
situations with a binding and a non–binding quantity restriction intersect.
Similar to the situation with no AD–regulation, the AD–strategy chosen by the
domestic ﬁrm depends on the entrance costs z. Given that the price restriction is





). When the entrance costs are higher, i.e. if z lies in the interval
[˜ z
;zB
). As a ﬁrm can never receive a higher proﬁt than the monopoly one and the




), the incumbent produces the monopoly quantity
in those situations.
5 Anti–dumping regulations as entry barriers
5.1 The effects of a minimum–price rule
Until now, we accepted the fact that some levels of the normal value are binding
and others are ineffective for each entry barrier z. To determine the effects of the
AS–regulation, we have to answer the question which levels of the norm quantity
and, hence, which normal values are constraining.
In general, the quantity restriction can be regarded as completely ineffective when
ﬁrms behave as though no AD–regulation exists. This involves two prerequisites:
(i)the minimum–pricerule has to bephysicallyineffectiveand (ii)thenormalvalue
has to leavethe ﬁrms’ strategic behaviourunaffected. For a given entry barrier, case
(i) requires the norm quantity to be higher than the total quantity supplied in a free–
trade situation. Henceforward, we refer to norm quantities satisfying case (i) as
physicallyineffectiveones.However,theremaybesituationsinwhichtheexistence
of an AD–regulation change the ﬁrms’ strategic behaviour although the restriction
is physically ineffective. Accordingly, case (ii) requires that the ﬁrms behave as if
no restriction exists. For a givenentry barrier, we refer to norm quantitiessatisfying
10case (ii) as being strategically ineffective. As a consequence, normal values for
which case (i) and (ii) are met, are completely ineffective.
In a free–trade situation, the domestic ﬁrm applies three different strategies: behav-
ing as a monopoly, deterring or allowing entry. As the entrance is blocked for high




), the incumbent has a monopoly. The total quan-
tity supplied equals the monopoly output S














), the incumbent allows entry,
so that the total output equals the Stackelberg quantity 3S
=4. Therefore, the norm







































It is also worth mentioning that the maximal quantity the incumbent produces to
defend the domesticmarket exceeds the total output in a Stackelberg situation. This
can be seen by replacing the entry barrier z by the deﬁnition of zDL in equation (7)
and noting that 3
p
2S
=4 is higher than 3S





=4 are ineffectivefor all levelsof theentry
barrier. However, it is shown below that this conclusion is misleading as it neglects
the second condition being met.
Requirement (ii) refers to the strategicbehaviour of both ﬁrms. In examiningwhich
set of normal values are strategically ineffective for a given entry barrier, we only
have to analyse the incumbent’s proﬁts. This can be seen by noting that the do-
mestic ﬁrm has the ﬁrst–mover advantage to choose a capacity and, hence, a quan-
tity in the pre–entry period t1. The foreign ﬁrm observes the incumbent’s decision
and optimally responds. Accordingly, the domestic ﬁrm chooses the AD–strategies
whenever doing so yields the higher proﬁt than applying the free–trade strategies.

















































). Then, the set of entry barriers where the


























































































































Figure 2. Situations with strategically effective but physically ineffective AD–rules
This proposition determines the combinations of the entry barrier and the norm
quantities which alters the strategic behaviour of the ﬁrm in presence of an AD–
regulation. The information given in proposition 1 is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The
grey shaded area marks the combinations of z and Qn where the domestic ﬁrm
earns higher proﬁts when adopting the AD–strategies. Consequently, the white ar-
eas show the combinations of z and Qn where the incumbent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
apply the free–trade strategies. Consequently, those combinationsof z and Qn show
where the AD–regulation is strategically ineffective. The white area to the lower
right site of the ﬁgure shows that market entry occurs for certain norm values.
Proposition 1 and, hence, ﬁgure 1 do not require the norm quantities to be physi-
cally ineffective.Using theinformationgivenin equation(15) togetherwith theone
stated in proposition 1 ensues in ﬁgure 2. Here, the dark grey shaded area displays
the combinations of the entry barrier and the norm quantity where the domestic
ﬁrms chooses the AD–strategies although the minimum–price regulation is phys-
ically ineffective. The white areas show combinations of z and Qn for which the
corresponding minimum–price rule proves to be completely ineffective.
12The existence of an AD–regulation may also affect the total quantities supplied.





















The ﬁrst line applies whenever the foreign ﬁrm enters the market due to low entry
barriers and both ﬁrms play a Stackelberg game. The second line is associated
to situations in which the domestic ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deter entry. Since
the incumbent is a monopoly when z
> zB independent of the existence or non–
existence of AD–regulations, we do not consider these cases here. Similarly, we
























We deﬁne a situation to be pro–competitive whenever QP
> QF.










u be deﬁned as above. Then,
the set of entry barriers where the incumbent applies the AD–strategies and a pro–










































































































Again, the proposition does not require the minimum–price rule to be physically
ineffective. However, it is easy to see that zc
u and za
u have smaller values than zDL
in the relevant range of the norm quantities. As a consequence, the combinations
of z and Qn stated in proposition 2 refer to situations, in which the AD–regulation
is physically ineffective. Hence, they describe situations where no entry occurs
although it were possible.
5.2 Discussion
As mentioned above, the maximum quantity that the domestic ﬁrm produces to de-
fend the market in absence of an AD–regulation equals 3
p
2S
=4. This suggests that
13z
Q










Figure 3. Total quantities supplied in a free–trade and an AD–situation
normal values corresponding to higher norm quantities are completely ineffective
for all levels of the entrance costs. However, an immediate result of proposition1 is
that there is no normal value in the range
(pc
;pm
], which is neither physically nor
strategically ineffective for all entry barriers. Reversely stated, every normal value
different from the price under perfect competition distorts the market outcome for
at least some levels of the entry barrier.
Thisalso impliesthatreducing theentrybarriers forforeignﬁrms is notsufﬁcientto
ensure market entrance. It can be illustrated by focussing on the special case of z
=
0. With no entrance costs for the foreign ﬁrm, the incumbent ﬁnds it unproﬁtable to
defend the home market in a free–trade situation. When an AD–regulation exists,
market entry occurs only if the normal value corresponds to norm quantities stated
in the two lower lines of equation (16). The lowest norm quantity where market
entry is possible, exceeds the total Stackelberg quantity of 3S
=4. As a consequence,
even if no market barriers exist, entry occurs only for speciﬁc normal values. In
addition, these normal values have to be considerably lower than the price in a
Stackelberg situation. This implies that even ’innocent’ looking minimum prices
have a distorting effect on competition.
The main subject of this paper is to show whether AD–rules facilitate the abuse
of market dominance. The abuse of market dominance requires that entrance and
consumer’s welfare are restricted. It is worth mentioning that the domestic ﬁrm
abuses its incumbency even under free trade. The incumbent’s ability to do so de-
pends solely on the level of sunk costs. This can be seen in ﬁgure 3. In the latter,
the dashed graph illustrates the total quantity supplied in a free–trade situation. For




), the incumbent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to allow en-





no market entry occurs. Yet, if the level of the entrance barrier is in the interval
[zDL
;¯ z
) the incumbent does not abuse its dominant position, as the total quantity
supplied exceeds the one in a Stackelberg situation. Therefore, the consumer’s wel-





), thedomesticﬁrm abuses itsdominantpositionsinceneithermarket entry
occurs nor is the total quantity supplied higher than the Stackelberg one.
In the anti–dumping regime, however, the proﬁtability of a deterrence strategy de-
pends on the interaction between the level of sunk costs and the level of the mini-
mum price. To analyse this case, it is convenient to distinguishbetween low–entry–









Concerning the ﬁrst prerequisite, ﬁgure 2 demonstrates that entry is deterred for
somenormalvaluesalthoughitwouldbegenerallyallowedinthefree–trade regime
for the low–entry–cost case. Therefore, it can be concluded that entry deterrence is
facilitated for those normal values. In the high–entry–cost cases, entrance is de-
terred in both regimes. However, the counter–conclusion of proposition 2 shows
that whenever the normal value is such that the incumbent chooses the AD–strat-
egies, the entry deterring quantity is lower as compared to the free–trade regime.
Again, deterring entry is facilitated for those normal values.
All cost intervals speciﬁed in proposition 2 belong to low–entry–cost cases. Sur-
prisingly, we ﬁnd a pro–competitive effect increasing the consumer’s welfare for
most situations, in which entry is deterred under AD–rules but not under free trade
as a consequence of this proposition. 11 Figure 3 illustrates this situation. However,
these effects require the normal value to be lower than the free–trade price, i.e. here
the one of the Stackelberg situation. This corresponds to norm quantities higher
than the total quantity in a Stackelberg game, which can be seen in ﬁgure 3. In
particular, we ﬁnd a pro–competitive effect increasing the consumer welfare for a
combination of low entrance costs and moderate normal values. For those combi-
nations, the incumbent does not abuse its dominant position even though no market
entry occurs.
In contrast, for the high–entry–cost case, the total quantity produced is lower when
the incumbent applies the AD–strategies as compared to the free–trade situation.
Again,ﬁgure3 illustratesthisresult. 12 Hence, itis easierfortheincumbentto deter
entry in an AD–regime. Consequently, the AD–rules produce an anti–competitive
effect. If entrance costs are high, entry deterrence under free trade ensues in a lower
consumer welfare. Yet, the total quantity produced is still higher than under AD–
protection. Accordingly, AD–rules facilitate the abuse of market dominance.
11 As proposition 2 in combination with ﬁgure 2 illustrates, there exists a small set of com-
binations of z and Qn, for which we ﬁnd a anti–competitive effect.




) the domestic ﬁrm will not choose
the AD–strategy so that the appropriate segment of the graph is irrelevant.
156C o n c l u s i o n
Our analysis has important implications for the interface between trade policy and
competition policy. The current administration of AD–legislation as minimum–
priceprotectionisfrequentlyinconsistentwiththeobjectiveofacompetitionfriend-
ly international trading system, in which both policy ﬁelds support each other in
maintaining market access and market contestability. We have shown that mini-
mum–price protection not only alters the strategic interactions among actual com-
petitors, but additionally among incumbents and potential competitors. Hereby,
even seemingly ’innocent’ minimum prices, i.e. minimum prices, which are equal
or below the competitiveprice (i.e. the ’true normal value’) distort the behaviour of
ﬁrms. Examples comprise the market deterrence for low entry costs and the abuse
of market dominance for high entry costs. Hence, our analysis suggests that avoid-
ing undesirable anti–competitive side effects of anti–dumping policy is not only a
matter of removing biases and distortions in the calculation of the normal or fair
value of the product.
The argument can be further strengthened. The entry may consist of two compo-
nents:administrativeand non–administrativeones. Examplesfortheformermay be
tradetariffsetc.Onemayarguethattheleveloftheadministrativeentrycostscan be
determined so that the AD–legislation can at least in principle ﬁnd normal values,
which are physically and strategically inefﬁcient. In contrast, non–administrative
entrance costs, as e.g. establishing a distribution network for the products or gain-
ing consumer conﬁdence, are market speciﬁc. They may vary between industries.
In addition, one may ﬁnd it impossible to determine the level of the relevant en-
trance costs. Yet, if the level of the entrance costs is uncertain it is impossible to
determine the normal value which leaves the market undistorted.
Appendix
A Reaction functions and entry deterrence
A.1 The foreign ﬁrm’s reaction function
As a Stackelberg follower, the foreign ﬁrm maximises its proﬁts given the output
of the domestic ﬁrm qH. The proﬁt maximisation is constrained by the quantity







































If theshadowprice ispositive,therestrictionis binding.In that case, qF
=QN
￿qH.
A.2 The domestic ﬁrm’s reaction function













































If the shadow price is zero, the inequality restriction is satisﬁed and the incumbent
chooses qH
= S
=2. We need not to consider the case when the inequality is not
satisﬁed as this situation is subject of the following maximisation problem.



























































￿S, then, l equals zero. From the ﬁrst of the ﬁrst–order condi-




) and consequently qH
= Qn.L e tq Hequal 2Qn
￿S.
17Hence, qH





). The latter expression should be positive, i.e. Qn
> S is
required. Yet, this contradicts the initial assumption that the norm quantity can rea-




]. Accordingly, qH always equals
the norm quantity Qn when the quantity restriction is binding. Then, the reaction





=2i f q H
< 2 Q n
￿S
Q n if qH
￿ 2Qn
￿S
A.3 Entry deterrence under free trade
The incumbent chooses to deter entry as long as pFD
H
> pFS
H .L e txbe deﬁned
as x
=: z
































)2. By applying the quadratic com-






)2. The latter expres-










j. Using the deﬁnition of x renders



















A.4 Entry deterrence under anti–dumping regulations
Using the deﬁnitions of the proﬁt functions pPD
H and pPS
H shows that the former























































> 0. It follows pPD
H
> pPS







B Proof of proposition 1
Theproofisconsistsofseveralsteps.First,thesetofentrybarriers isdeterminedfor
which theincumbent’sproﬁt withan AD–regulationexceeds the onein a free–trade
situation. Subsequently, 3 different cases are identiﬁed. Each case corresponds to a
set of norm quantities. For each of those cases it is veriﬁed whether the proﬁt under
AD–protection is higher then the appropriate one under free–trade.

















). Then, the proﬁt pPD
H given in equation (14)




H w a sd e ﬁ n e di n( 6 ) .p PD
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The proﬁt functions pPS
H and pFS










=2. Applying the quadratic completion, the latter












































































=b. Then, equation (14)



































),s ot h a tp PD
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< z B . The latter term is positive if y
> S










































> zB and z
< ˜ z
=2. Each of the possible solutions yield different































< 0. This inequality cannot be satisﬁed for z
from the real line. Hence, pPD
H
< pFD
h for For the ﬁrst inequality there is no solution
for z
























































































































































j. Using the deﬁnition of x and solving the latter
inequality for z shows that pPD
H
> pFD









































































Again, let x be deﬁned as x
=: z
=b. Applying the quadratic completion to equations























) 2 . It follows that pPS
H
> pFD










































2 is positive (negative) if z
> zB
(z
< zB). For z
> zB, the inequality (B.7) is equivalent to 2
p
x
> Qn.F o rz

























Depending on the norm value pn and, hence, the norm quantity Qn, there are three
different situations: case 1: ˜ z
< zDL
< zB, case 2: zDL
< ˜ z
< zB and case 3: zDL
<
zB
< ˜ z. For each case, we ﬁrst determine the set of norm quantities for which it is
deﬁned. Subsequently, we specify the set of entry barriers z for which the proﬁt is
higher when the AD–strategies are applied as compared to the free–trade strategies.
B.2 Case 1: ˜ z
< zDL
< zB ˜ z
< zDL
< zB ˜ z
< zDL
< zB
B.2.1 The set of norm quantities




H and applying the quadratic completion in the

















=32 and is always lower than zB. Therefore, z










































































































In section B.1.1 it has been shown that pPD
h
> pFS












] and ˜ z
< zDL
by assumption in present case, we have to consider whether za
l positive or negative
and whether za
u is smaller or larger than ˜ z.
21Using the deﬁnition of za















< 0. Since q
￿
F is positive as long as Qn










F. Applying the deﬁnition of q
￿
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u and ˜ z itcanbeseenthatza
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H by its deﬁnition and solving thelatter inequality for the































> ˜ z for all Qn
2 QI
l. By analogy, we ﬁnd that QI
u
￿ ˜ AI so that
za
u
< ˜ z for all Qn
2 QI
u.






























































H for all norm quantities
satisfying Qn
2 QI

















































Independent of the existence of an AD–regulation, the incumbent is a monopoly
whenever z
> zB. Therefore, we need only to consider situations in which z
< zB.
















). Hence, we have to show
whether zc
u is smaller or larger than zDL.
Using the deﬁnitions for zc












































H for all Qn
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) for all Qn
2 QI
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Result 4 If Qn
2 QI






















B.3.1 The set of norm quantities
From section B.2 we know that ˜ z
















At the same time, we require z to be lower than zB. In section B.2 it was also shown









). With the deﬁnition of zB
it can be seen that ˜ z
































Solving the latter inequality for Qn shows that ˜ z



























the restrictions for zDL
< ˜ z and ˜ z
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). Therefore, we have to determine
when za
l
< 0a n dw h e nz a
u
> z DL.
The last section has veriﬁed that za
l
< 0 whenever Qn
2 AI.A sQ II
l
￿ AI,w eﬁ n d
that za
l
< 0 for all norm quantities Qn
2 QII
l . By analogy, za
l








To check whether za







u lies necessarily to the left of zDL. With the deﬁnitions of za
u and
zd
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j. Solving for q
￿


























=8. With the deﬁnition of q
￿
F, the conditions can



















solution is irrelevant as Qn needed to be smaller than S
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The last paragraph has shown that za
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). On the other hand,
pPS




). Yet, this case presupposes that ˜ z
> zDL,s ot h a ta
comparison between pPS
H and pFS
H is not necessary for norm quantities from QII
l and
AII
l . Therefore, we only have to determine whether pPS
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24Result 7 If Qn
2 QII
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B.4 Case 3: zDL
< zB
< ˜ z zDL
< zB
< ˜ z zDL
< zB
< ˜ z
B.4.1 The norm quantities
From section B.3 we know that ˜ z








































Section B.1.1 has shown that pPD
H
> pFS






]. Again, we have to determine whether za
l is positive or negative and
whether za











































), it follows that za
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< 0f o ra l l
Q n
2 A III
l .L e tA III




l . Then, za
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> 0f o ra l lQ n
2 A III
u .
As in the last section, za
u
> zDL if za
u
< zd




l if and only if Qn
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Since this case presupposes that ˜ z
> zB and pPD





need to compare pPD
H and pFD
H apart from the one between pPD
H and pFS
H . The last
section has also shown that za
u
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2AII
















B.5 Summary of the results



































































































































































C Proof of proposition 2
The proof of proposition 2 follows the same logic than the one of proposition 1.
First, the set of entrance costs is determined for which the total quantity under a
binding AD–regulation is higher than the one under free trade. Subsequently, for
each of the three cases (cf. below), it is veriﬁed which set of norm quantities corre-
spond to the set of entrance costs. Finally, we determine the set of norm quantities
for which we have a pro–competitive effect and the where the norm quantities are
not strategically ineffective.
Figure C.1 and C.2 present the total quantities under free trade and a binding AD–
regulation which are given in equation (17) and (18). As ˜ z depends on the norm
quantity we can distinguish three cases: (1) ˜ z
< zDL
< zB,( 2 )z DL
< ˜ z


















Figure C.2. Total quantity supplied under AD–rules
For case (1), we have to compare (a) graph
A and





D as ˜ z lies to the left of zDL.
Case (2) describes situations in which ˜ z lies to the right of zDL, so thath we have to
compare (a) graph
A and
C , (b) graph
B and
C and (c) graph
B and
D.






C.1 Comparison of the total quantities
The total quantities supplied under free trade and under a constraining AD–regula-
tion are given in equations (17) and (18). In this section, we determine for which
sets of the entrance costs QP
















































D is associated to Qn. Therefore,
D
>


































u was deﬁned in section 1. It follows that
D
>










































￿Qn, the inequality can



























C.2 Case (1): ˜ z
< zDL
< zB ˜ z
< zDL
< zB ˜ z
< zDL
< zB
It has been shown in section B.2 that ˜ z
< zDL
< zB as long as the norm quantity
belong either to QI
l or QI
u speciﬁed in equation (B.9). Figrue C.3 illustrates the




In section C.1.1 it was shown that
C
>
A and, hence, QP















) is also required.
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zDL ˜ z 0
Qn





















l it follows that QF
>
QP for all Qn
2 QI














At least in principle, ˜ z may lie to the right of za in which case
A and
C do not cross
in the valid range of z. Using the deﬁnitions of ˜ z and za shows that ˜ z









). Employingthe deﬁnition ofq
￿
H and rearranging yields Qn
<S which
is satisﬁed for all Qn per assumption. Therefore, ˜ z







Result 11 If Qn
2 QI
l,Q F















According to section C.1.2,
D
>
A and therefore also QP
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Result 12 If Qn
2 QI
l,Q F















Section C.1.3 has shown that
D
>
B and, hence, QP

















) is the valid








). It is ﬁrst shown that zc
u
< zB and subsequently, that zDL
< zc
u.
Using the deﬁnitions of zc












Applying the deﬁnition of q
￿
F and solving for the norm quantity yields Qn
> S
=2,
which is true by our initial assumption. Therefore, zc
u
< zB for all norm quantities
in the valid range.























































l we ﬁnd that zDL
< zc



















































Result 13 If Qn
2 QI
l,Q P














Combining results 11–13 we ﬁnd:
Result 14 If Qn
2 QI
l,Q P

























It has been shown in section B.3 that zDL
< ˜ z
< zB as long as the norm quantity
belong either to QII
l or QII
u speciﬁed in equation (B.13). Figure C.4 illustrates the



































> QP for all
30z
Q
˜ z zDL 0
Qn
Figure C.4. Case (2)
Qn
2 QII












) is non–empty. za
may lie to the right or to the left of zDL. Using the deﬁnitions or za and zDL, it can
be seen that zDL























￿3S2. Applying the quadratic completion, this
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2
A lII. As a consequence, QP








Result 15 If Qn
2 QII
l ,Q F





























Section C.1.4 has demonstrated that QF
> QP for every range of entry barriers. We
ﬁnd therefore the following result.
Result 16 QF













zDL ˜ z 0
Qn




By ﬁgure C.4, the relevant range is here z
2
[˜ z
;zB. From section C.1.3 we know that
QP






For case (1) we have demonstrated that zc
u
< zB for all Qn
< S, which is satisﬁed by
the initial assumption on the valid range of the norm quantity. However, zc
u may lie

















H and solving for Qn,











































































































Summarising results 15–17 we ﬁnd the following result.
Result 18 QP







































32C.4 Case (3): zDL
< zB
< ˜ z zDL
< zB
< ˜ z zDL
< zB
< ˜ z
In section B.4 is has been shown that case (3) is valid for Qn
2 QIII. The situation




Again, we have to compare the segment
A and
C . From section C.1.1 we know that
QP
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2
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) is nonempty. From
section C.2 we know that zDL
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It has also been shown in section C.1.4 that QF
> QP for all z. Accordingly, we can
summarise the results in
Result 19 QP



































































































33C.5 The strategically effective combinations
To ﬁnd the combinations of z and Qn for which we have pro–competitive effect
where the AD–regulation is not strategically ineffective, we have to ﬁnd the inter-
































































































FS. Collecting terms and applying















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































u is a subset of the latter interval,
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u . From sec-
tion 1 we know that za
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> 0f o rA III
u . We also know that zd
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from section 1 that za
l
> 0f o rA II
l .A sz d
l




















































l . The results of sec-
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has been veriﬁed in section 1. za
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uby the results of
section 1. From the last section we know that za
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We know also from the last section that za
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Summarising the results shows that set of entrance costs z where the incumbent ap-
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